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During the last decade the European Commission has progressively adopted what
is called a ‘more economic approach’ toward competition policy. This approach,
which draws on U.S. antitrust policy, puts greater emphasis on possible
welfare effects of business practices and is less concerned with competitive
market structures. Under this school of thought concentration cannot be said
to impede effective competition to the extent that efficiency gains outweigh
market distortions. In order to stimulate the debate on this basic
reorientation, in January 2009 the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and
International Private Law at Hamburg convened economists, legal scholars, and
practitioners for an exchange of views on these ‘new’ methodological
foundations of EU competition policy and competition law. Two especially
controversial elements were chosen for in-depth discussion: the prohibition of
abuses of dominant positions and the review of State aid. This book reproduces
fourteen papers from this conference, representing the considered views of
prominent European lawyers, economists, academics, policymakers, and
enforcement officials in the competition field on matters such as:
• the objectives of EU competition law;
• the current enforcement guidelines of the EU Commission regarding Article
102 TFEU measuring market power
• abusive low pricing strategies
• the economics of competition law enforcemennt
• recent developments in EU State aid law
• economic justifications for State aid.
A critical assessment of the Commission’s State aid action plan by the German
Monopolies Commission is appended in English. Applying law and economics
theory to competition law, this book shows that the ‘more economic’ approach
is exerting a considerable impact on various sectors of competition law. The
authors clearly demonstrate the progress that can be made when lawyers and
economists take notice of and respect the characteristics of each other’s
discipline. Moreover, the authors show how new insights of economic theory may
be integrated into the relevant legal analysis. The book will therefore be
appreciated by academics, practitioners, and officials representing both
fields.
Part I: The More Economic Approach in EU Competition Law. Introduction;
J. Basedow. The More Economic Approach Paradigm: An Effects-based Approach to
EU Competition Policy; C. Esteva Mosso. Protection of Competition v.
Maximizing (Consumer) Welfare; D. Zimmer. The European Commission’s Priorities
for Enforcement of Article 102 TFEU; S. Albœk. Part II: Studies on
Article 102 TFEU. The Dominance Threshold in Article 102 TFEU; G. Monti.
The Dominance Threshold: A Comment; C. Ewald. Predatory Pricing: From
Price/Cost Comparisons to Post-Chicago Thinking; W. Wurmnest. Predatory
Pricing: A Comment; P. Choné. Part III: Studies on State Aid.
European State Aid Control: The State Aid Action Plan; U. Schwalbe. The
General Block Exemption for State Aid; P. J. Slot. Part IV: Round Table on
State Aid. The Need for a More Economic Approach; J. Kühling. Some Remarks
from a Judicial Point of View; J. Azizi. Towards a More Economic Control of
State Aid in Europe; L. Repa. EU State Aid Policy, Economic Approach,
Bailouts, and Merger Policy: Two Comments; W. Kerber. Annex:
Monopolkommission: The ‘More Economic Approach’ in European State Aid Control.