The enforcement of the EC antitrust rules is currently the subject of much discussion. The existing system for the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC has been widely criticised as inadequate. Several changes have been introduced recently, and further reforms have been proposed, but the search for a coherent and effective enforcement regime remains unfinished.
Combining an in-depth examination of the law with a systematic economic analysis, Wouter Wils provides clear and illuminating answers to the major questions concerning the modernisation of EC antitrust enforcement:
Should a notification system be maintained, or should the antitrust rules be enforced exclusively through deterrence?
What are the respective roles of the European Commission, the national competition authorities and the national courts?
At what level should fines be set?
And is there a need to criminalise EC antitrust law by introducing individual penalties, in particular imprisonment?
Practitioners, officials and academics will find in this timely book a wealth of information on the existing enforcement practice and on the pending proposals for reform, as well as a rigorous intellectual framework that will structure and clarify current and future debate on the modernisation of EC antitrust enforcement.
1. Introduction 1.1. Subject
Matter 1.2. Method
2. EC Competition Fines: To Deter or not to Deter 2.1.
Introduction 2.2. Fines versus other Methods of Law Enforcement
2.3. The Correct Basis for Assessing Fines 2.4. The
Practice of EC Competition Fines (1969-1994) 2.5. Do current Fines
Deter? 2.6. To Deter or not to Deter
Commission Notice on The Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases
3.1. Summary of the Commission Notice 3.2. Precedents in The EC and
in the US 3.3. Leniency and the Economics of Law Enforcement 3.4.
The Conditions for Leniency Revisited 3.5. Legal Basis, Compatibility
with General Principles and Binding Effect 3.6. Has the Cartel
Enforcement Problem now been solved? 4. The Commission’s New Method
for Calculating Fines in Antitrust Cases 4.1. Summary of the Commission
Notice 4.2. The new Method Compared to Existing Law and Previous
Practice 4.3. The Issue of Transparency 4.4. Some Further
Characteristics of the new Method 4.5. Conclusion
Notification, Clearance and Exemption in EC Competition Law 5.1.
Introduction 5.2. The Economics of Prescreening 5.3.
Application to EC Competition Law Enforcement
6. The Commission’s Proposal for a new Council
Regulation Replacing Regulation no 17 6.1. Introduction 6.2. The
Timing of Legal Intervention: Ex Ante Enforcement Through Prescreening or Ex
Post Enforcement Through Deterrence? 6.3. The Respective Roles of The
Commission and the Competition Authorities of The Member States 6.4.
The Role of Private Complainants and National Courts 6.5. Sanctions
7. The Undertaking as Subject of EC
Competition Law and The Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal
Persons 7.1. The Undertaking as Subject of EC Competition Law 7.2.
The Imputation of Infringements to natural or Legal Persons
8. Does the Effective Enforcement of Articles 81 and
82 EC Require not only fines on Undertakings but also Individual Penalties, in
particular imprisonment? 8.1. Introduction 8.2. Who Commits
Antitrust Violations, Why do they do it, and how can their Behavior be
influenced? 8.3. The Case for Corporate Sanctions 8.4. The Case
against Exclusive Reliance on Corporate Sanctions 8.5. The Case for
Combining Corporate Sanctions with individual Penalties 8.6. The Case
for Imprisonment 8.7. Some Further Issues
9. Conclusion 9.1. The Timing of Legal Intervention: Ex Ante
Enforcement through prescreening or Ex Post Enforcement through Deterrence?
9.2. The Role of Different Enforcement Agents: The Commission, The
Competition Authorities of The Member States, Private Complainants and
National Courts 9.3. The Form of Sanctions: Fines on Undertakings,
Fines on Individuals or Imprisonment? 9.4. The Problem of Under
deterrence with Regard to the Most Serious Antitrust Violations 9.5.
The Historical and Cultural Dimension, References, Table of Cases, Subject